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Abstract
We study the taxation of couples when female wages do not reect their true
productivity. We show that the expression for the marginal tax rates of the male
spouses is the same as in a Mirrleesian world where wages reect true productivities.
Marginal taxes for the female spouses are reduced because of a Pigouvian correction.
Consequently, the wage discrimination pleads for a lower marginal tax on the female
spouse. Furthermore, the distortion of a couplestradeo¤ between male and female
labor supply is the same as in a Mirrleesian world without a gender wage gap.
It only depends on true productivities and not on wages. In other words, the tax
system completely neutralizes the extra distortion introduced by the wedge between
the female spouses wage and her true productivity.
JEL-Classication: H21, H31, D10, J16, J22
Keywords: Couplesincome taxation, gender wage gap, optimal income taxation,
household labor supply
1 Introduction
While plain discrimination appears to be declining, gender inequalities in the labor
market remain substantial. These di¤erences cannot be explained solely by gender
di¤erences in schooling, experience and job characteristics; see Blau and Kahn (2017).
Instead the main suspectto explain the persistence of the gender wage gap (GWG)
is the so-called child penalty, see for instance Kleven et al. (2018). Women who have
interrupted their career for full- or part-time child care, su¤er from a wage penalty which
lingers for decades when then they start to care for their dependant parent and su¤er
the good daughter penalty. While part of this child penalty is explained by persistent
part time work of more family friendly career choices, it also includes a discrimination
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part in that it introduces a wedge between wages and true productivities. For instance,
Waldfogel (1997) concludes, based on longitudinal data that even after controlling for
part-time employment, a negative e¤ect of children on womens pay remains.
There appears to be a large societal consensus that this GWG ought to be eradicated
or, at least, mitigated. This probably requires some drastic and potentially costly
reforms of labor market and child care policies. Anyway, the trends observed over the
last decades show that, even in the best case scenarios the GWG will continue to be
around for quite a while.
Since the diseaserequires a long cure and convalescence, it appears to be desirable
to treat and alleviate its symptoms in the meantime. In this note, we study one
possible approach to such a symptomatic treatment, namely the proper design of the
tax system and, particularly, the tax treatment of couples.
To make this point in the simplest possible way, we consider a population of unitary
couples where male wages reect their true productivity, while female spouses receive a
wage which is a given (possibly couple specic) proportion of their true productivity. In
other words, the wage di¤erential is exogenous and the factor of proportionality lumps
together all the factors a¤ecting the GWG including plain discrimination and, most
signicantly, the child penalty or at least the part of it which cannot be explained by
part-time work or career choices.
Our model is otherwise similar to Cremer et al. (2012) in that we study the Mir-
rleesian optimal taxation of male and female incomes and, particularly, the way it a¤ects
the spousesrelative labor supplies. These are already distorted because of the GWG,
and we examine if it is possible and desirable to undo these distortions via the tax
system.
Couples income taxation has of course already been widely studied in the litera-
ture; see Cremer et al. (2016) for an overview of the most signicant contributions.
From a methodological perspective the innovative feature of this note is that it explic-
itly accounts for gender wage discrimination and distinguishes between wages and true
productivities. This aspect has to our knowledge so far been neglected in the literature
and our analysis represents a rst step to address this omission.
2 Model
Consider a population consisting of N types of couples, indexed i = 1; :::; N . The
proportion of type-i couples is i. Spouses are indexed by the subscript j = f;m.
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A couples type is determined by the vector (nif ; n
i
m; w
i
f ; w
i
m), where n
i
j is spouse js
true productivity. Technologies are linear so that marginal and average products are
identical and constant. Furthermore, wij = 
i
jn
i
j represents the wage rate that spouses
receive for their `ij units of labor so that gross earnings are y
i
j = w
i
j`
i
j . We make the
traditional assumption that gross earnings are observable while wages and labor supplies
are not. Wages may or may not reect a spouses real productivity. To capture in the
most parsimonious way the GWG, we assume that if  im = 1. When if < 1 the
female spouse receives a lower wage for any given level of productivity than the male
spouse. We impose no restriction on the distribution of productivities, except that it
is discrete. In particular, the number of types can be arbitrary large (but nite) and
spouses productivities may or may not be correlated.
The utility of couple i is given by U(xi; `im; `
i
f ); where x
i is the consumption of a
numeraire (private) good. The utility function is such that @U i=@xi > 0 and @U i=@`ij <
0. To express utilities as functions of observable variables, dene:
V i(xi; yim; y
i
f )  U
 
xi;
yim
wim
;
yif
wif
!
:
Observe that:
@V i
@yij
=
@U i
@`j
1
wj
< 0; j = f;m: (1)
2.1 Couples optimization
The couple faces an income tax schedule T (yif ; y
i
m) so that its disposable income available
for consumption xi is:
xi =
X
j=f;m
yij   T (yim; yif ): (2)
The couple chooses its labor supplies, yim; y
i
f and consumption x
i to maximize V i subject
to the budget constraint (2). The rst-order conditions (FOCs) associated with this
problem can be written as:
MRSixyj =  
@V i=@yij
@V i=@xi
= 1  T iyj i = 1; :::; N ; j = f;m (3)
where T iyj  @T i=@yij denotes the marginal tax rate faced by spouse j in couple i.
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3 Optimal tax problem
We consider (constrained) Pareto e¢ cient allocations obtained by maximizing the fol-
lowing welfare function
W =
NX
i=1
iiV i
 
xi; yim; y
i
f

; (4)
where i is the weight attached to couple i. While each spouses before tax income yij
is publicly observable, wages and labor supplies are not. The statistical distribution
of types, on the other hand, is common knowledge. Under the considered informa-
tion structure, the governments instrument consists of a possibly nonlinear income tax
scheme T (yif ; y
i
m) which can be positive or negative.
Feasible allocations must satisfy the following incentive constraints
V i = V i
 
xi; yim; y
i
f
  V ib = V i xb; ybm; ybf 8 i 6= b: (5)
That is any type-i couple must be prevented from mimicking any type-b couple. In
addition, the resource constraint
NX
i=1
"
yim
im
+
yif
if
  xi
#
 0 (6)
must hold. Note that the resource constraint depends on true productivities of the
spouses. To maintain the disconnection between households and rms, which is tra-
ditional in optimal tax models, we assume that rmsprots are taxed at 100%; see
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
The government maximizes (4) subject to (5) and (6). The Lagrangean can be
written as:
L =
NX
i=1
iiV i + i
NX
i=1
"
yim
im
+
yif
if
  xi
#
+
NX
i=1
NX
b=1;b6=i
ib
h
V i   V ib
i
;
where  > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint while ib  0 is the
Lagrange (Kuhn-Tucker) multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint from a
type-i to a type-b couple.1 The FOCs with respect to xi and yij are given by:
@L
@xi
= ii
@V i
@xi
+
NX
b=1;b6=i
ib
@V i
@xi
 
NX
b=1;b6=i
bi
@V bi
@xi
  i = 0; (7)
@L
@yij
=
24ii + NX
b=1;b6=i
ib
35 @V i
@yij
 
NX
b=1;b6=i
bi
@V bi
@yij
+ i
1
ij
= 0: (8)
1Since the incentive constraints are inequalities this is a Kuhn Tucker problem so that either the
constraint is binding or the associated multiplier is equal to zero.
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The FOCs along with the constraints determine the (constrained) Pareto e¢ cient allo-
cation. These conditions and all our subsequent results are very general. They do not
depend on the pattern of binding incentive constraints nor on the type of mating, and
they are valid for all constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations.
Appendix 4 shows that by combining the two FOCs, the marginal rate of substitution
between gross income and consumption can be expressed as
MRSixyj =
ii +
PN
b=1;b6=i ib  
PN
b=1;b6=i bi
@V bi=@xi
@V i=@xi
ij

ii +
PN
b=1;b6=i ib  
PN
b=1;b6=i bi
MRSbixyj
MRSixyj
  1
ij
Aij : (9)
3.1 Marginal tax rates
Combining equations (3) and (9) we can determine the marginal tax rate of the imple-
menting tax function. The full information solution which is a useful benchmark can
be obtained from (9), by setting all s equal to zero (bi = ib = 0 8 i; b = 1; : : : ; N).
This yields:
MRSixyj =
1
ij
;
which, from equation (3) implies:
T iyj =
if   1
if
 TPiyj : (10)
We dene (10) as the Pigouvian tax rate. Indeed, in a full information setting the GWG
is formally equivalent to an (non-anonymous) externality. First-best Pareto e¢ ciency
can then be reestablished by a simple, albeit individualized, Pigouvian tax and any
redistribution can be done via lump-sum taxes and transfers. With our illustrative
assumption that if  im = 1 we have TPiym = 0 and TPiyf  0. No Pigouvian correction
is needed for the male spouse, while a Pigouvian subsidy applies to all female workers
for whom ij < 1.
Returning to the asymmetric information case, equations (3) and (9) result in:
T iyj = 1 MRSiIyj = 1 
1
ij
Aij : (11)
Let us dene the (traditional) Mirrleesian tax rate without gender wage gap, as TMiyj =
1 Aij . It describes the solution to the optimal tax problem when ij = 1, for all spouses
in all couples (i = 1; : : : ; N and j = f;m). Using (10) expression (11) can be written
as:
T iyj = 1 
1
ij
Aij =
TMiyj
ij
  1  
i
j
ij
=
TMiyj
ij
+ TPiyj : (12)
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Let us rst consider the top-couple, that is the couple (if any) whom nobody wants to
mimic implying bi = 0 8 b 6= i.2 For spouse j = f;m within this couple, we have
T iym =0; (13)
T iyf =
if   1
if
< 0: (14)
For the male spouse the traditional no distortion at the topresult emerges, while for
the female spouse we get a marginal Pigouvian subsidy if if < 1.
For all other couples the expressions for the marginal tax rate include a Mirrleesian
(incentive) term and a Pigouvian term. Observe that while the Pigouvian term is exactly
at its rst-best level, the Mirrleesian analogy applies only to the rule.3 The fact that the
Mirrleesian tax rate is divided by ij may at rst come as a surprise, but it has a simple
explanation. The Mirrleesian rate applies by denition to yij = w
i
j`
i
j . However, since the
Pigouvian correction is also applied, the true income of spouse j is nij`
i
j = w
i
j`
i
j=
i
j .
The incentive part of the optimal tax rule then simply says that the Mirrleesian rate
is applied to the true income of the spouse (as measured by their marginal product
multiplied by labor supply).
When the assumption if  im = 1 is imposed we then have
T iym = T
Mi
ym ; (15)
T iyf  TMiyf so that T iyf R 0 , TMiyf R 1  if : (16)
The marginal tax rate of the female spouse is always smaller than the Mirrleesian
rate. In the traditional case where the Mirrleesian rate is positive, there is then a
conict between incentive and Pigouvian considerations. If the wage gap is large it may
outweigh the traditional tax argument and imply a negative marginal tax rate for the
female spouse.4
Another way to look at these results is to examine how female discrimination (if 
im = 1) a¤ects the spouses relative marginal tax rates. The conventional wisdom,
which goes back to Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) (B&S) is that women should face
lower marginal tax rates than their spouse because their labor supply is more elastic.
2 In a fully edged multi-dimensional setting there is no guarantee that such a couple exists. This
has no impact on any of the other results.
3A caveat which applies to almost all results in optimal tax theory.
4Since we consider a multi-dimensional setting and have made no assumption on the distribution of
types there is no guarantee that all Mirrleesian marginal tax rates are positive. When the Mirrleesian
rate for the female spouse is negative, there is no conict between the two terms and expression (16)
necessarily implies a negative marginal tax for the female spouse.
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Cremer et al. (2012) have shown that this result may be mitigated or even reversed
for incentive reasons, in particular, when gender wage heterogeneity is smaller in high-
income couples. In their setting there is a gender productivity gap but it reects true
productivities and not discrimination. Our results, go exactly in the opposite direction
in the sense that they tend to reinforce or reinstate the B&S result. Discrimination
brings in the Pigouvian term which reduces the marginal tax rate applied to the female
spouse.
Proposition 1 (i) When couplestypes are observable and the female spouse in couple
i su¤ers from wage discrimination, that is if < 1, her income will be subject to a
Pigouvian subsidy to correct for the misallocation of her labor supply.
(ii) When couples types are not observable a spouses marginal income tax rate
is dened by expression (12), which shows that it depends on a Pigouvian and on a
Mirrleesian (incentive related) term. The Mirrleesian term can either be positive or
negative, while the Pigouvian term is always negative for if < 1. If the gender wage
gap is large it may outweigh the traditional tax argument and imply a negative marginal
tax rate for the female spouse.
(iii) Our results reinforce (or tend to reinstate) the B&S result that female spouses
should have a smaller marginal tax rate than males.
3.2 The tradeo¤ between female and male labor supply
Combining expressions (1) and (3) shows that in the absence of taxation a couple chooses
`f and `m so that:
MRSi`f `m =
@U i=@`m
@U i=@`f
=
wim
wif
: (17)
We can think about condition as a kind of production e¢ ciency condition within
the household. It describes the e¢ cient tradeo¤ of a couple which has to earn a given
gross income ym + yf in a least costly, utility maximizing, way. When wages reect
marginal products, condition (17) is also necessary for Pareto e¢ ciency. In our setting
with the GWG Pareto e¢ ciency, however, requires:
MRSi`f `m =
nim
nif
: (18)
In a full information world the Pareto e¢ cient tradeo¤ can then be decentralized by
imposing a Pigouvian tax as dened by equation (10). To see this, observe that (1)
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and (3) imply that in the presence of taxation spouses levels of labor supply are set
according to:
MRSi`f `m =
1  T iym
1  T iyf
wim
wif
:
Using (10) and the property wij = 
i
jn
i
j shows that the above equation coincides with
(18) when T iyj = T
Pi
yj 8j.
We know from Cremer et al. (2012) that the optimal tax policy will in general
distort the tradeo¤ between male and female labor supply. As these authors show this
distortion arises for incentive reasons; it is a way to relax an otherwise binding incentive
constraint. With no GWG, we have from (1) and (3):5
MRSi`f `m =
1  TMiym
1  TMiyf
wim
wif
: (19)
With the GWG, combining (1), (3) and (12) we successively obtain:
MRSi`f `m =
1  T iym
1  T iyf
wim
wif
=
1  TMiym
1  TMiyf
f
m
wim
wif
=
1  TMiym
1  TMiyf
nim
nif
: (20)
Comparing equations (19) and (20) shows that with the GWG the distortion of couples
tradeo¤ between male and female labor supply with respect to the true productivities
is the same as in a Mirrleesian world without a GWG. Intuitively, this is in line with
the results presented in the previous subsection. Since the marginal tax rates, as de-
ned by (12), already involve a Pigouvian correction for the GWG, a couples tradeo¤
between male and female labor supply is e¤ectively based on the spouses (relative) true
productivities. In a full information setting, this tradeo¤ would remain undistorted.
Under asymmetric information, the arguments presented in Cremer et al. (2012) carry
over and imply that it should, in general, be distorted. But the crucial point is that
these are traditional incentive corrections which are not directly a¤ected by the GWG;
the reference they are applied to is the spouses relative productivities and not their
wages.6 To sum up, while the tax system distorts the spousesrelative labor supplies
for incentive reasons it completely neutralizes the distortion introduced by the wedge
between the female spouses wage and her true productivity.
5Recall that with no GWG if = 
i
m = 1 so that T
i
yj = T
Mi
yj .
6Once again this result applies to rules ; actual levels may di¤er.
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Proposition 2 The distortion of a couples tradeo¤ between male and female labor
supply is the same as in a Mirrleesian world without a GWG. It only depends on true
productivities and not on wages.
4 Conclusion
We have studied the design of couples income taxation when there is a GWG which
reects the fact that female wages do not reect their true productivities. Marginal
tax rates for males follow the same rule as in a Mirrleesian world. Those for women
include a Mirrleesian and a Pigouvian term. The Mirrleesian expression is the same as
when wages reect true productivities. The Pigouvian term, which is always negative,
corrects for the wedge between wages and productivities. Consequently, the GWG tends
to reduce the optimal marginal tax on women. Finally, a couples tradeo¤ between
male and female labor supply is the same as in a Mirrleesian world without a GWG. It
only depends on true productivities and not on wages. While the tax system distorts
the spousesrelative labor supplies for incentive reasons it completely neutralizes the
distortion introduced by the wedge between the female spouses wage and her true
productivity.
The main lesson that emerges from our paper is that the GWG reduces the fe-
male spouses marginal tax rate by a Pigouvian correction. This correction undoes
the distortion in spousesrelative labor supply caused by the GWG. While this does
not eliminate the GWG, it means that it is possible and desirable to restore a tradeo¤
between spouseslabor supplies that reects their true productivities.
To sum up, and to return to the question raised in the introduction, an appropriately
designed general income tax can and should neutralize the distortions created by wage
discrimination. In particular, production e¢ ciency for the spouses relative labor
supplies is reestablished.
Appendix
Derivation of MRSixyj : Equations (7) and (8) can be rearranged as:
i
@V i=@xi
=ii +
NX
b=1;b6=i
ib  
NX
b=1;b6=i
bi
@V bi=@xi
@V i=@xi
; (A1)
i
@V i=@xi
=  ij
24ii + NX
b=1;b6=i
ib
35 @V i=@yij
@V i=@xi
+ ij
NX
b=1;b6=i
bi
@V bi=@yij
@V i=@xi
: (A2)
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With the denition of the marginal rate of substitution, we can rewrite (A2) as:
i
@V i=@xi
=  ijMRSixyj
24ii + NX
b=1;b6=i
ib +
NX
b=1;b6=i
bi
MRSbixyj
MRSixyj
35 (A3)
Combining (A1) and (A3) and solving for MRSixyj yields expression (9).
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